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Social and economic
problems in Cuba








Up to 1989, social policy in Cuba achieved very notable advances
in education, health, social security, employment and income
distribution. The collapse of the socialist bloc and other internal and
external factors, however, gave rise to a severe crisis, which reached its
bottom in 1993 and led to a deterioration in almost all the social
indicators. The modest market-oriented reforms introduced in 1993-1996
generated a partial recovery but were later interrupted and have been
reversed since 2003. The social indicators improved after 1994, but in
2003 some of them had still not regained their 1989 levels and poverty
and inequality had increased. This article evaluates the economic and
especially the social evolution of Cuba between 1989 and 2004, on the
basis of Cuban statistics and publications, ECLAC documents, and a
recent study of economic and social aspects in 1997-2002 jointly
published by ECLAC, the National Economic Research Institute of Cuba,
and the United Nations Development Programme.
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like to express my thanks for the valuable comments on a preliminary
version made by Claes Brundenius, Sergio Díaz-Briquets, Manuel
García Díaz, Jorge Pérez-López, Joseph Ramos and Archibald Ritter,
together with the comments of two anonymous referees.
Up to the end of the 1980s, social policy in Cuba had
achieved very notable advances in education, health,
social security, employment and income distribution,
thanks to the priorities and financial resources assigned
by the government and the aid amounting to US$ 65
billion provided by the Soviet Union between 1960 and
1990 (Mesa-Lago, 2000) as well as the assistance of
the other member countries of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CMEA). The collapse of the
socialist bloc, preceded in Cuba by the recession
caused by the anti-market approach taken during the
Rectification Process (1986-1990), and the inability of
the Cuban model to generate sustainable economic
growth, expand and diversify exports, and achieve
import substitution provoked a severe crisis, which
reached its worst point in 1993. Because of this, almost
all the social indicators deteriorated, in spite of the
efforts of the government. The modest market-oriented
reforms, mostly introduced between 1993 and 1996,
generated a partial recovery, but it slackened in 2000-
2002, partly because of the virtual paralyzation of the
reform process. The social indicators improved after
1994, but in 2003 some of them had still not regained
their 1989 levels and poverty and inequality had
increased (Mesa-Lago, 2003a and 2003b; Mesa-Lago
and Pérez-López, 2005).
This article evaluates the economic and especially
the social evolution of Cuba during “The Special
Period in Time of Peace” (1990-2004), which makes
it different from the treatment often given to this
subject in the literature, limited to certain phases in that
period and lacking an integrated long-term analysis.
For simplicity’s sake, however, the statistics provided
correspond to years which correspond to three different
points in that evolution: 1989 (the eve of the crisis),
1993 (the worst moment in the crisis) and 2003 (the
most recent year for which data are available). The
analysis is based on Cuban statistics and publications,
several documents of ECLAC and other international
organizations, and recent works by this and other
authors. Among the ECLAC documents, special mention
is made of those on structural reforms and economic
and social performance in the 1989-1998 period (ECLAC,
1997 and 2000a). Detailed references are also made of
a recent work entitled Política social y reformas
estructurales: Cuba a principios del siglo XXI (Álvarez
and Máttar, eds., 2004),1 published jointly by ECLAC, the
National Economic Research Institute of Cuba (INIE),
and the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), which concentrates on social aspects and is
restricted to the 1997-2002 period.
In the following sections, this article presents a
summary of Cuba’s economic evolution (section II),
an evaluation of social problems —poverty, income
distribution, unemployment, nutrition, education,
health, social security and assistance, and housing—
during the crisis and subsequent recovery (section III),
and a discussion on whether Cuba is an integral
development model for the region (section IV).
1
 The main topics of the relevant chapters in Álvarez and Máttar
(2004) and their authors are as follows: a summary of economic
performance (Jesús M. García Molina); an overview of social policy
and nutrition (Angela Ferriol); education, health and employment
(Victoria Pérez Izquierdo); water supply, sanitation and housing
(Aída Atienza); social security and assistance (Maribel Ramos), and
conclusions and future prospects (Beatrice Dhaynaut and Jorge
Máttar). There is also a statistical annex which is available on the
web site of the ECLAC Subregional Headquarters in Mexico
(www.ecla.cl/mexico/) and which will henceforth be referred to as
“Anexo Estadístico”, followed by the corresponding table number.
All the authors except two are Cuban, and the chapters on social
policy were written by researchers of the National Economic
Research Institute of Cuba (INIE). Frequent references are made in
the present article to those authors, giving as the source their
contributions to Álvarez and Máttar (2004).
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II
A summary of Cuba’s economic evolution
Table 1 summarizes the main Cuban economic
indicators from 1989 to 2003: the internal macroeconomic
indicators, those on physical production, and the
external indicators.
1. Internal macroeconomic indicators
A serious obstacle to evaluating the evolution of GDP
over the 1989-2003 period is the fact that in 2001 the
base year for calculations at constant prices was
changed from 1981 prices to 1997 prices. The new
series of the National Statistical Office (ONE, 2002 and
2003) only covers the 1996-2003 period, and when it
is compared with the same years in the previous series
(ONE, 1998 and 2001) it results in a systematic annual
increase of 60% in the value of the GDP, without the
authorities having given any explanation of this
anomaly. As the new series does not go back to 1989,
TABLE 1
Cuba: Economic indicators, 1989, 1993 and 2003




Average annual GDP growth, 1981-1989 and 1990-2003 (%) 2.9 –0.5a –83
Per capita GDP (constant pesos) 1 852 1 172 1 538b –17
Investment/GDP (%) 15.2 6.7 7.8c –49
Inflation rate (%) 0.5 25.7 –1.0 –100
Monetary liquidity/GDP (%) 21.6 73.2 42.7  98
Fiscal balance/GDP (%) –7.2 –33.5 –3.2 –56
Physical production (thousands tons)
Sugar 8 121 4 246 2 200 –73
Nickel 47 30 72 53
Oil 718 1 107 3 609 402
Electricity (millions of kwh) 16 11 16 0
Cement 3 759 1 049 1 345 –64
Textiles (millions of square meters) 220 51 28 –87
Fertilizers 898 94 72 –91
Cigars (units) 308 208 308 0
Livestock (millions of head) 4.9 4.6 4.0 –18
Fish and shellfish 192 94 67 –65
Cow’s milk 1 131 585 607 –46
Eggs (million units) 2 673 1 512 1 785 –33
Citrus fruit 1 016 644 793 –22
External indicators (thousand millions)
Exports of goods (pesos) 5.4 1.1 1.6 –70
Imports of goods (pesos) 8.1 2.0 4.6 –43
Merchandise trade deficit (pesos) 2.7 0.9 3.0 11
Terms of trade (1989=100) 100.0 54.4 44.3 –56
External debt (dollars) 6.2 8.8 11.0 77
Foreign aid/investment (dollars) 6.0c 2.5c –58
Exchange rate (pesos per dollar) 7 78 26 271
Gross income from tourism (dollars) 550 700 1 996 262
Remittances (dollars) 0 0 915
Source: Figures for 1989: Comité Estatal de Estadísticas (1991); 1993: ONE (1998); 2002-2003: ONE (2003 and 2004) and ECLAC (2004);
on aid/investment and terms of trade: Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López (2005); on remittances: ECLAC (2003a).
a Average for 1990-2000 at 1981 prices, combined with average for 2001-2003 at 1997 prices.
b The per capita GDP for the year 2000 at 1981 prices was projected to 2003 on the basis of the 2001-2003 growth rate at 1997 prices.
c Soviet aid only in 1989.
d Total accumulated disbursed investment, 1991-2002.
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it is impossible to compare the GDP in the two series
for 1989-1995 (Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López, 2005).
Furthermore, since 2002 the Cuban authorities have
criticized the methodology used to calculate GDP in the
System of National Accounts, claiming that it
adversely affects Cuba because it underestimates the
value of free social services and consumer price
subsidies, and in the last two years they have therefore
published alternative figures which increase the value
of GDP still further (Rodríguez, 2002, 2003 and 2004).
Table 1 shows that GDP grew at an annual rate of
2.9% in 1981-1989 but, because of its sharp drop in
1990-1993, averaged –1.4% for the 1991-2000 period:
the lowest rate for the whole of Latin America and the
Caribbean, according to data from the Preliminary
Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC, 2000c).2 In an attempt to make up
for the lack of a continuous series, I have added the
years 2001 to 2003 to the average for the 1990-2000
period, estimating an average annual rate of –0.5% in
1991-2003. A rough calculation of per capita GDP in
2003 indicates that that year was still 17% below the
1989 level.
The gross investment rate at current prices (not
published in Cuba at constant prices) went down by
49% between 1989 and 2002, from 15.2% to 7.8% of
GDP.3 The ECLAC series on gross domestic investment
at constant prices gives higher figures: for example,
12.2% versus 7.8% in 2002 (ONE, 2003; ECLAC, 2004).
García Molina (2004, pp. 19 and 36) states that “Cuba
stands out in the region by its low investment
coefficient”; between 1977 and 2003 that coefficient
went down from 16.2% to 10.8% and external saving
sank from 1.9% to 0.6%, which means “a serious
process of decapitalization” that could hinder medium-
term growth.
According to official figures, the inflation rate,
which stood at 25.7% in 1994, went down markedly,
and there was deflation in the six years from 1995 on
(inflation in 2003 was 1%). No official information is
available, however, on the calculation of the consumer
price index and the GDP deflator, which are crucial not
only for estimating inflation but also the GDP growth
rate at constant prices, real wages, real budgetary
expenditure, etc.4 Monetary liquidity decreased with the
economic recovery, but in 2003 it was nevertheless
equal to 43% of GDP: twice as much as in 1989. García
Molina considers that the increase in liquidity in 2002
affected the upsurge of inflation to 7% in that year, but
it is hard to understand why, although total monetary
liquidity increased by 27% between 1999 and 2001,
there was average deflation of 2.2% over the same
period (García Molina, 2004, p. 43; ONE, 2003).
An important achievement was the reduction of
the fiscal deficit from 33.5% of GDP in 1993 to 3.2%
in 2003 (half the 1989 level). A contributory factor in
this was the improvement in tax revenue after the 1994
tax reform, but in 2003 60.6% of such revenue came
from indirect taxes with regressive effects, while only
39.4% was generated by direct progressive taxes
(Anexo Estadístico, I-20). On the expenditure side,
subsidies for the losses of State enterprises went down
to 1.3% of GDP in 2001 but rose again to 2.8% in 2002
and 3.9% in 2003 (Álvarez and Máttar, 2004; Anexo
Estadístico, I-20).5 Furthermore, according to García
Molina (2004, pp. 39-40) GDP growth has been based
on the expansion of government consumption
represented by increased fiscal spending, and the high
defence and internal security expenditure —which
amounted to 4% of GDP, the second highest percentage
in the region (UNDP, 2004)— were due solely to the
“dispute between Cuba and the United States”, leaving
out internal factors such as the increase in the size of
the police force and the high cost of armed forces
pensions.
2. Physical production
Table 1 shows that after sharp declines in the main
products of the agricultural, mining and manufacturing
2
 After 2000, the Preliminary Overview, published annually by
ECLAC, suspended the series giving the annual average GDP for the
last ten years.
3
 In actual fact, there are two Cuban investment series at current
prices: that published up to 2000 gave a level of gross domestic
investment higher than that published since 2001, although the
change in the base year for calculating constant prices should not
affect the figures at current prices (ONE, 2001 and 2003).
4
 There is no published information on the components of the
“shopping basket”, the prices and weights of goods and services
provided through rationing, the agricultural market, stores that only
accept foreign currency, and own-account workers, nor on the way
those components have varied in importance over time, nor on how
the foreign-currency value of economic activity is converted into
pesos.
5
 García Molina says that in 2002 there were “increasing subsidies
granted to cover losses by State agricultural enterprises” and that
the reduction of such subsidies would “help significantly to put fiscal
expenditure on a sounder basis and free resources to aid in the
recovery of investment” (García Molina, 2004, pp. 33 and 54).
Subsidies for losses by State enterprises grew by 210% between
2001 and 2003, reaching 3.9% of GDP (ECLAC, 2004).
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sectors, especially in 1993, there was a recovery, but
in 2003 only two products had exceeded their 1989
levels (oil, by 402%, and nickel, by 53%). Two others
had recovered the 1989 levels (electricity and cigars),
but the other nine were between 18% and 91% below
such levels. García Molina attributes the drop in sugar
production (by 2.3% per year in the 1998-2002 period)
to hurricane damage, but output went down steadily
from 8 million tons in 1989 to 4 million in 1993 and
2 million in 2003 (73% below the 1989 level). Internal
problems such as high costs, low levels of
competitiveness and profits, technological
backwardness and lack of incentives, together with low
world prices, forced the reorganization of the sugar
industry in late 1992, the closing down on 46% of the
sugar mills, and the shifting of half the area planted
with sugar cane to other crops. García Molina
highlights the increase in the production of roots and
tubers, green vegetables and pulses in 1997-2002 but
says nothing of the following drops in production: 45%
in poultry meat and 20% in beef, 14% in the number
of head of livestock and 7% in milk production in the
same period, as well as 45% in the catch of fish and
shellfish in 1997-2002 and 26% in rice production in
1996-2003 (ONE, 2003; ECLAC, 2004). While
acknowledging some of the domestic problems, García
Molina maintains that a deepening of the agricultural
reforms would help to raise food production and reduce
the need for imports, as well as bringing down prices,
which continue to be high (García Molina, 2004, p. 28).
Outputs of cement, textiles and fertilizers in 2003
were between 64% and 91% below the 1989 levels.
García Molina notes that there are shortcomings in
terms of industrialization: little change in the
composition of exports, low value added, minimal
levels of integration, little inter-firm cooperation and
technical backwardness. After reporting that
manufacturing production stagnated in 1998-2002, he
highlights the notable increases in the output of oil, gas
and non-metallic minerals (sectors in which there has
been foreign investment), but fails to note that nickel
production fell by 6.3% in 2001-2003, while in 1998-
2002 the output of textiles went down by 44%, that of
fertilizers by 39%, and that of cement by 22% (ONE,
2003; García Molina, 2004).
3. The external sector
In spite of the recovery, in 2003 the value of exports
was 70% below the 1989 level and that of imports was
43% lower, giving a trade balance deficit of 2,957
pesos (table 1). Although this deficit was only 11%
greater than that of 1989, at that time 84% of the deficit
was with the Soviet Union, which gave Cuba automatic
credits to cover it that were never repaid; now,
however, Cuba has to seek scarce loans for short terms
at high interest rates. García Molina does not touch
upon this crucial problem, asserting that in 1998-2002
the volume of goods exported rose while that of
imports went down, and that “there was an increase in
external sales of non-traditional products with high
value added, such as biotechnological and
pharmaceutical goods, medical equipment and
advanced diagnostic media” (García Molina, 2004,
p. 49). The official figures, however, show a 20% drop
in the value of exports between 1998 and 2002, as well
as a 1% increase in the value of imports in the same
period, giving rise to and increase of 10.8% in the
merchandise trade deficit (ONE, 2004). Moreover, in
2002 the value of pharmaceutical and medical products
was only 3% of the total value of exports and went
down to only 1% in 2003; furthermore, the Anuario
estadístico de Cuba does not disaggregate exports of
medical equipment and advanced diagnostic media
(ONE, 2003 and 2004). In contrast the respective
proportions of traditional exports in the total in 2002
were: sugar, 32%; nickel, 29%; tobacco, 10%, and
fishery products, 7%. The terms of trade deteriorated
by 56% in 1989-2003.
The share of food imports increased from 12% to
19% between 1989 and 2002, while those of
manufactures rose from 14% to 23%; imports of
machinery and transport equipment, however, declined
from 31% to 24% (Comité Estatal de Estadísticas,
1991; ONE, 2003). This indicates a deterioration in the
level of self-sufficiency in food production, import
substitution and industrialization. García Molina (2004,
p. 46) warns that the “meagre agricultural performance”
has an adverse impact on the fiscal and external
deficits, because it “makes it necessary to import large
volumes of foodstuffs [since 2002, mainly from the
United States] and hinders the growth and
diversification of exports”. Cuba is now a net food
importer, foreign exchange outlays exceed income in
this respect, and the agricultural food export sector now
registers a deficit instead of a surplus. As production
of meat, milk, rice and beans is insufficient, these
products must now be imported and account for half
the total value of food imports (Ferriol, 2004b, p. 143).
Tourism and remittances from abroad were
positive factors in the balance of payments. Tourism
generated nearly US$ 2 billion of gross income in
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2003 and became the main source of foreign exchange,
but the cost of the necessary imports per peso of
income was high (reducing the net income by 35% in
that year), while the occupancy level of the hotel
infrastructure was low, thus “causing the
immobilization of resources despite the big investment
effort” (García Molina, 2004, p. 23). In fact, the
occupancy level went down from 64% in 1998 to 55%
in 2003, while average daily income per visitor fell
by 13% (Álvarez and Máttar, 2004; Anexo Estadístico,
I-15). The second largest source of foreign exchange
for Cuba (exceeding that generated by sugar and
nickel together) was remittances from abroad, which
were estimated by ECLAC to amount to US$ 915 million
in 2003 (table 1).6
The external debt, measured in US dollars,
increased by 77% between 1989 and 2003, but García
Molina reports that it went down from 43.3% of GDP
in 1997 to 35.5% in 2002 because of the appreciation
of the dollar over the euro and the yen in that period
and the accumulation of interest arrears (García
Molina, 2004, p. 50). As a percentage of the value of
exports of goods and services, however (an indicator
traditionally used by ECLAC), the debt increased from
255% in 1997 to 262% in 2003, and in the latter year
it amply exceeded the regional average of 172%
(ECLAC, 2003a). Moreover, whereas in 1989 Cuba
received US$ 6 billion of aid from the Soviet Union,
total foreign direct investment accumulated in the
period 1991-2002 was only US$ 2.5 billion, equivalent
to an annual average of US$ 200 million, and it has
gone down in recent years. The United States embargo
has been a negative factor, and it was stepped up in
1996 and 2004, but it is not the fundamental culprit of
Cuba’s poor economic performance (Mesa-Lago and
Pérez-López, 2005).
6
 This figure is taken from ECLAC (2003a), but the 2000-2003 figures
do not appear in the annual reports by ECLAC on the economic
evolution and future prospects of Cuba (ECLAC, 2003b and 2004).
Other estimates of the remittances vary from only US$ 100 to 400
million (see Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López, 2005).
III
Social problems during the crisis and
subsequent recovery
This section contains an analysis of the main social
problems during the worst stage of the crisis and their
subsequent improvement, though not always complete
recovery: namely, poverty, inequality, unemployment,
nutrition, education, health, social security and
assistance, and housing.
1. Poverty
Cuba has not published official statistics on poverty
incidence. In 1997 it introduced the concept of the
“population at risk” of poverty, defined as persons
without sufficient income to acquire a basic basket of
food and non-food goods (equivalent to the poverty
line). The methodology calculates the cost and
nutritional contribution of the foodstuffs sold at
subsidized prices7 and assumes that the rest of the basic
basket is obtained on the free market at the prices
prevailing there; it also incorporates into the income
of the population the value of the social services
provided free of charge (Informe de Cuba, 1997;
Ferriol, 2004a, p. 78; Ferriol and others, 1998). A
Cuban economist (Togores, 1999) has estimated
Amartya Sen’s “poverty severity index” for the whole
of the Cuban population (not only the urban
population) in 1995, as well as the poverty incidence
without taking into account the free social services and
price subsidies. Lastly, in 2002 a survey was made of
the personal perception of poverty in the capital, in
which the interviewees were asked to classify
themselves in one of three categories: poor, almost
poor and not poor. Table 2 summarizes all these rough
estimates: the urban population at risk trebled between
1988 and 1999, increasing from 6.3% to 20%, and
7
 The average monthly subsidy per inhabitant through the system
of rationing was 6 pesos in 2002, equivalent to 2% of the average
wage according to my calculations.
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TABLE 2
Cuba: Poverty estimates, 1988-2002
1988 1995 1996 1999 2002
Estimates by Ferriol
Total urban population at risk (% of population) 6,3 14,7 20,0 a
Population at risk in the city of Havana (% of population) 4,3 20,1 11,5
Perception of poverty in terms of income inthe city of Havana (% of population) 31,0b
Estimates by Togores
Sen’s index (severity of poverty)c 0,39 - 0,42d
Poverty incidence (% of total population) 61 - 67d
Source: Ferriol (2004a; 2003) and Togores (1999).
a According to Ferriol (2003), the preliminary calculations for 2001 confirm a resistance to a downward movement of the percentage of the
population at risk, which would indicate that that percentage remained around 20%.
b Also, 23% of “almost poor”.
c For a large population, Amartya Sen’s poverty severity index (P) may be expressed as follows: P = H[I + (1-I) Gp ], where H is the
incidence of poverty (population under the poverty line, divided by the total population); I is the income gap, understood as the difference
between the poverty line and the average income of the poor population, in relation to the poverty line; and Gp is the Gini coefficient for
the income distribution of the poor. P varies between 0 and 1, having a value of 0 if the whole population has an income higher than the
poverty line, and 1, if the income of the whole population is zero.
d Variants obtained by using different income distributions.
remained at the latter level in 2001; in the capital it
increased from 4.3% to 20% between 1988 and 1995
but subsequently went down to 11.6% in only one
year.8 The figures of other estimates are much higher:
the poverty severity index was 0.39-0.42, the poverty
incidence in the population as a whole was 61%-67%
in 1995, and the perception of poverty in the capital
was 31% in 2002. Although the measurement
techniques used were very diverse, these figures all
indicate an increase in poverty throughout the period.
Ferriol (2004a, p. 81) compared the urban
population at risk in Cuba in 1999 with the incidence
of poverty in four Latin American countries in 2001-
2002, placing Cuba after Uruguay as one of the
countries with the least “urban poverty”. She left out
Costa Rica, however, which had a lower poverty
incidence than the population at risk in Cuba, and
Chile, which had a similar incidence, and included
instead Colombia and Ecuador, which are countries
with a high incidence of poverty (ECLAC, 2001).
2. Inequality
In the second half of the 1980s (during the anti-market
Rectification Process), “society tended to become more
homogeneous” through two means: more equal access
to consumption, and the reduction of wage differences.
This weakened wages as an incentive to work harder,
however, and up to 1994 there was “high absenteeism”
and a “high level of disguised unemployment”. The
reforms made in the 1990s restored incentives to work
harder, but widened wage differences and created a
segmented consumption market, thus increasing
inequality (Ferriol, 2004a, pp. 67-71).
Average real wages in the State sector fell by 45%
in 1989-1998 according to ECLAC, and by 32% in 1989-
2002, according to a Cuban economist (Togores, 1999;
Togores and García, 2003; Togores, 2004), measured
in both cases at 1981 prices. Pérez Izquierdo, in
contrast, shows an increase of 17.4% in 1998-2002,
based on 1997 prices. The change in base year results
in a real wage almost three times higher in 1998, 2000
and 2002 (table 3). At the same time that real wages
declined in the State sector, private sector incomes
grew considerably, and remittances heightened the
inequality. In 1989 the ratio between the highest and
lowest wages was 4.5:1. Although the comparison is
not exact, in 1995 the ratio between the average income
of the top decile and that of the lowest decile of
households in the capital was 150:1, and it increased
to 199:1 in 2001 (Quintana, Nova and others, 1995;
Espina, 2003).
Ferriol claims that rationing at subsidized prices
reaches all families and covers at least 50% of
nutritional requirements. It is very well known,
however, that nowadays the foodstuffs included in the
8
 The greater increase of the “population at risk” in the capital over
urban areas as a whole is explained by growing inequality, but this
is in contradiction with the reduction of the “population at risk” in
1996 despite the overall increase in inequality; furthermore, the
reduction of almost 9 percentage points in a single year is doubtful.
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rationing system only cover about a week’s needs, and
the rest of the month it is necessary to buy food in the
free farmers’ markets, stores that only accept foreign
exchange, and the illegal informal market, where prices
are much higher than those of rationed goods and/or
demand the possession of foreign exchange. The lowest
income deciles spend 88% of their total food budget
in those markets; moreover, 62% of households receive
foreign exchange mainly from remittances from
abroad, which further heightens the social inequality
between those who have access to foreign exchange
and those who have not (Ferriol, 2004a, pp. 66 and 72-
78; Ferriol, 2004b, pp. 147-150).
The foregoing indicates that there has been an
increase in inequality in income distribution. This is
also indicated by some estimates made by Cuban and
foreign economists (table 4).9 The Gini coefficient went
up from 0.22 in 1986 to 0.407 in 1999; the percentage
of total income received by the poorest quintile went
down from 11.3% to 4.3% over the same period, while
the percentage received by the richest quintile rose
from 33.8% to 58.1%, and the ratio between the
average income of the richest quintile and that of the
poorest rose from 3.3 to 13.5. In spite of this, Ferriol
(2004a, p. 83) asserts that “the Cuban population
continues to be that with the lowest inequality in Latin
America and the Caribbean”. This assertion is taken
from a previous study (ECLAC, 2000b, pp. 37-38) that
compared the Gini coefficient of 13 countries but did
not include Cuba.10 On the other hand, Fabienke (2001)
estimates for the year 1995 a level of inequality much
higher than that shown by other authors for years close
to that date.
TABLE 3
Cuba: Estimates of average real monthly wages
in the State sector, 1989-2002
Estimates 1989 1998 2000 2002 Variation (%)
ECLAC (index 1990=100)a 104 57 –45
Togores (pesos)a 130 73 83 89 –32
Izquierdo (pesos)b 206 242 242 17
Source: ECLAC (2000a), Togores (1999), Togores and García (2003), Togores (2004), Pérez Izquierdo (2004c).
a At 1981 prices.
b At 1997 prices.
TABLE 4
Cuba: Estimates of inequality, 1986-1999
Year Gini coefficient Income quintiles
Poorest Richest Ratio of richest to
(0-20%) (81-100%) poorest
1986 0.22 11.3 33.8 3.3
1989 0.25 8.8 33.9 3.8
1995 0.55
1996 0.39 4.8 54.4 11.3
1996-98 0.38
1999 0.407 4.3 58.1 13.5
Source: Brundenius (2002) for 1986, 1989, 1996 y 1999; Añé (2000) for 1996 and 1999; Fabienke (2001) for 1995, and Ferriol (2004a) for
1996-1998.
9
 The estimates do not specify the concept of income used: whether
it includes that generated by the market, the State and by remittances;
whether it is before or after taxes (including the very high surcharge
applied in the stores that only accept hard currency), and whether
or not it includes social benefits and services or extra payments in
convertible pesos and in kind. They are therefore not strictly comparable.
10
 In the 33 tables and 18 figures of the ECLAC study, many of which
refer to equity, Cuba only appears in three: two which are irrelevant
because they refer to demographic matters, and one on the coverage
of services.
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3. Employment, unemployment and productivity
The open unemployment rate went down from 7.9%
in 1989 to 7% in 1997 and 2.3% in 2003 (ECLAC, 2000a
and 2004). The abrupt drop of almost five percentage
points in the last six years is doubtful or conceals
considerable under-utilization, for various reasons:
i) in 1995 the Secretary-General of the Cuban Trade
Union Confederation (CTC) estimated that between
500,000 and 800,000 State workers were
unnecessary (surplus) and should be relocated
(cited in Mesa-Lago, 2000), but the corresponding
number was reported as only 19,000 in 1997
(Pérez Izquierdo, 2004c, p. 191);
ii) ECLAC (2000a, pp. 252-253) estimated that the
“equivalent unemployment” rate was 25.7% in 1997
(7% of open unemployment plus 18.7% of under-
utilization) and 25.1% in 1998 (6.6% and 18.5%,
respectively): this series was later suspended;
iii) average gross investment per job created was
seven times greater in 1975-1989 than in 1995-
2000, so that the 800,000 new jobs created in the
latter period must be of lower productivity (García
Díaz, 2004);
iv) 219,600 sugar workers were affected in 2000 by
the closure of 45% of the sugar mills and cane
plantations;
v) non-State employment shrank from 23.4% to
20.8% in 2001-2002;11
vi) in 2002 “high levels of underemployment” still
prevailed (Dhaynaut and Máttar, 2004, p. 317), and
vii) in 2002, 14% of those interviewed in the survey
on poverty in the capital considered themselves
to be poor in terms of employment, and 13%
considered themselves to be almost poor (Ferriol,
2003).
Table 5 compares the estimates of Pérez Izquierdo
(2004c) on the economically active population (EAP),
employment and unemployment in 1998 and 2000 with
those of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and
the National Statistical Office of Cuba (ONE). For 2000,
Pérez’s estimate of the EAP is 920,000 lower than that
of the ILO, while his estimate of employment is 536,000
higher than the figure for “total employed persons in
the economy” given by the ONE. If the total employed
persons in the economy refers only to employment in
the civil sector, then the difference of 536,000 (almost
10% of the EAP) must be accounted for by persons
employed in the armed forces and internal security.
Assuming that the sum of the civil and military sectors
is 4,379,000 (the figure given by Pérez Izquierdo), then
according to that author unemployment should be only
5.4%. If we use the EAP estimated by the ILO, however
(which is 20% higher than that of Pérez Izquierdo), this
leaves a residue of 1,173,000, which could be the
number of unemployed and would be equivalent to
21% of the EAP (in 1998 and 2000), almost four times
the percentage estimated by Pérez Izquierdo. Such a
rate would be similar to the rate of between 16% and
28% in the 1994-2000 period calculated by a former
Vice-Chairman of the Central Planning Board of Cuba
(García Díaz, 2004).
TABLE 5
Cuba: Comparison of estimates of economically active population,
employment and unemployment, 1998 and 2000
1998 2000
Pérez Izquierdo ILO/ONE Pérez Izquierdo ILO/ONE
EAP (thousands) 4 573 5 438a 4 632 5 552a
Employment (thousands) 4 288 3 754b 4 379 3 843b
   Estimate of non-civil sectorc 534 536
Unemployment (thousands) 285 252
   Residue 1 150d 1 173d
Unemployment rate (%)  6.2  21.1e  5.4  21.1e
Source: Álvarez and Máttar (2004), ILO (2004a), ONE ( 2003), Pérez Izquierdo (2004c).
a ILO estimate; the figure for 1998 is my interpolation between 1995 and 2000.
b
“Total employed persons in the economy” according to the  ONE, probably only the civil sector.
c Subtraction of Pérez Izquierdo’s estimated employment from the  ONE’s employment figure; probably persons employed in the armed
forces and internal security.
d Subtraction of Pérez Izquierdo’s employment figure from the ILO’s estimate of the EAP.
e Residue as a percentage of the EAP estimated by the ILO.
11
 Self-employment decreased from 3.8% to 3.4% of total
employment, members of cooperatives from 8% to 7%, and the
private sector from 14.7% to 13.1% (Pérez Izquierdo, 2004c, p. 201).
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Apart from the problem of statistical credibility,
the extremely low official rate of open unemployment
in 2003 conceals the persistence of high levels of
underemployment which probably also include many
persons who are not employed at all. Since 2001, the
government has created five new “full employment”
and “study as employment” programmes:
i) 326,000 in the cultivation of food crops in
backyards or urban gardens, partly on a part-time
basis and for family consumption;
ii) 238,000 for disabled persons in regular jobs, work
to be carried out at home, cultivation of gardens,
or studying on socio-cultural courses;
iii) 116,000 young people enrolled in night-school
courses and receiving remuneration for this;
iv) 44,000 sugar workers who were laid off but are
now studying (“study as employment”) and
receiving a wage, plus another 20,000 who are in
higher education;
v) 8,500 who are taking ten-month courses in social
work and who are guaranteed subsequent
employment or entry into university courses in the
humanities, and
vi) 10,514 “interrupted” workers laid off due to the
temporary closure of their places of employment,
who are sent home with 60% of their normal
wage, and 1,654 “available” workers who have
not yet been relocated but also receive a wage
(Pérez Izquierdo, 2004c, pp. 193-198 and 214;
Dhaynaut and Máttar, 2004, p. 317).
In 2002, the 764,668 persons participating in these
programmes were equivalent to 16% of the EAP of 4.7
million estimated by Pérez Izquierdo, and although this
author does not specify how many of them are
considered to be employed, the vast majority, if not all
of them, have probably been counted as such.
Pérez Izquierdo rightly notes that the policy
applied in the 1990s – maintaining the jobs and wages
of workers of enterprises which closed down or
interrupted production because of the crisis – caused
under-utilization of the labour force and a decline in
productivity. He claims, however, that the recovery and
business improvement programme succeeded in
relocating workers, creating 435,000 new jobs,
reducing underemployment and raising average labour
productivity by 1.8% per year in 1998-2002 (Pérez
Izquierdo, 2004c, pp. 190-192 and 216). According to
ECLAC (2000a, p. 235), however, productivity in 1997
was still 20 percentage points below the 1989 level,
and in 1998-2002 it went down still further or
stagnated. On the basis of the annual rates estimated
by Pérez Izquierdo for 1998-2002, I calculate that
productivity in 2002 was still 12.6 percentage points
below the 1989 level. Moreover, after the start of the
“full employment” and “study as employment”
programmes, the rate of change of productivity was
0.1% in 2001 and –0.1% in 2002 (Pérez Izquierdo,
2004c, p. 216).
Wages rose faster than productivity in 1998-2002,
according to Pérez Izquierdo, because of the creation
of new jobs of a social nature with wages higher than
the national average, the de-linking of pay from work
results in some activities, and the insufficient
evaluation of the application of payment and incentive
systems (Pérez Izquierdo, 2004c, pp. 206-207). The
crisis and the employment policies applied led to a
drastic change in the composition of the EAP by sectors
of activity between 1991 and 2002 (in percentage
points): according to data from ECLAC (2000a, table
A-46) and Alvarez and Máttar (2004, p. 199), there
were declines in manufacturing (–4.1), construction
(–3.6), transport and communications (–1.3) and
mining (–0.4), but increases in community, social and
personal services (7.8), agriculture (1.2), and commerce,
hotels and restaurants (0.7). In 1997-2002, most jobs
were created in community, social and personal services
(which grew by 68%), but this was the sector that
suffered the biggest drop in average productivity
(–3.7%). Although Pérez Izquierdo (2004c, pp. 209
and 215) does not analyse these problems, he does
issue a warning: “The government continues to apply
an employment and wage policy which involves two
very different rationales: those of economic and of
social considerations. Because of the government’s
humanistic calling, priority is given to the second of
these, [but the present difficult conditions] … demand
that solutions be found to the problems which are
limiting the country’s economic performance”.
4. Food
Before the crisis, rationing satisfied the nutritional
needs of the population, even if only in a meagre
manner, but at present —in Havana, which has the best
supply of rationed foodstuffs in the country— it only
satisfies 51% of the recommended intake of calories,
43% of that of proteins, and 17% of that of fats (Ferriol,
2004b, p. 147). The amounts provided under rationing
have been reduced, while the cost of buying food and
other essential consumer goods in the free markets has
increased. At the end of 2002, the monthly rations per
person included (in pounds): beans, 1.25; lard or oil,
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0.5; rice, 6; meat, chicken or fish, 2.7 in total; sugar,
5; and roots and tubers, 15, as well as 8 eggs, which,
except in the case of sugar and roots and tubers, only
covers the needs of approximately one week. The
ration of toilet and laundry soap was half a cake per
month (Togores and García, 2003). The prices in the
free markets were between 4 and 49 times the price of
the same goods when received through rationing. The
average monthly wage, at the exchange rate of 26 pesos
per dollar paid in the government money changing
offices (CADECAs), was equivalent to 16 dollars, with
which it would be possible to buy one cake of soap,
half a litre of oil and one pound of taro in the stores
which only accept foreign currency (Mesa-Lago and
Pérez-López, 2005).
According to Ferriol, the production and average
per capita consumption of green vegetables, fruit and
roots and tubers in 2002 was above the 1989 level, but
that of meat, fish, eggs and milk was well below that
level; furthermore, the quality of these products has
gone down and the possibility of recovering the pre-
crisis level is beyond the functions and possibilities of
the present socio-economic model.12 This author adds
that in 1998-2002 the total volume of food
consumption improved, although it did not always
achieved the recommended average nutritional levels:
the calorie intake exceeded them by 16%, but that of
fats was 41% below them, and that of proteins 2%
below (Ferriol, 2004b, pp. 140-145). According to
international organizations, however, in 2001 Cuba was
7% below the regional average for calorie availability
and 13% of its total population was undernourished in
1998-2000, the Cuban levels being exceeded by eight
other countries of the region (PAHO, 2004; UNDP, 2004).
The shortage of food is officially explained by the
limited and uneven recovery of agricultural and
industrial production and the chronic shortage of
foreign exchange, which restricts the capacity to import
goods. These problems are attributed in turn to the
economic crisis of the 1990s and the prior vulnerability
due to excessive external dependence. However, this
does not explain why, in the three decades before the
crisis, and in spite of the abundant aid received from
the socialist countries, Cuba was incapable of
increasing and diversifying its exports and successfully
promoting import substitution, and nor does it explain
the generalized decline in agricultural production.
Ferriol considers that the transformation of the State
farms into basic cooperative production units (UBPC in
Spanish) was a positive step, but in reality these
production units are part of the problem: the
government, which directs their production plans, sold
them the buildings and the equipment (a debt which
they have to repay), but 40% of these production units
registered losses in 2003 and received fiscal subsidies;
moreover, these units have to sell almost all their
output to the State at prices below those that they
would receive if they could sell directly to consumers,
and their sales to the agricultural markets are subject
to price ceilings. Because of these problems and the
lack of incentives, in 2002 the basic cooperative
production units, which controlled 45% of the total area
of cultivated land (plus the 10% corresponding to the
agricultural production cooperatives (CPA in Spanish)),
only supplied the free agricultural markets with 3% of
the products sold there; in contrast, private peasants had
only 21% of the cultivable land but supplied 67% of
the products sold, while the State, which had 24% of
the cultivable land, supplied the remaining 30% (ONE,
2004; García Molina, 2004).13 This is in contrast to the
successful example of China, where the land was given
to families, groups of workers and village communities
which are free to decide what to produce, who to sell it
to, and at what price. If Cuba had followed this policy,
it would probably be self-sufficient in food and would
have an exportable surplus too.
5. Education
During the crisis, education suffered the effects of the
lack of resources: there was a reduction in the school
meals service, a deterioration in the infrastructure, a
shortage of educational materials, and a decrease in
school transport. The rate of enrolment in primary
education remained virtually unchanged, but the
secondary enrolment rate, as a percentage of the
school-age population, fell from 90.2% in 1989 to
74.5% in 1994, although in 2002 it recovered to 89%
(UNESCO, 1999 and 2004). Total university enrolment
went down by 56% during the worst stage of the crisis;
it subsequently began to rise again, but in 2002-2003
12
 At 1981 prices, personal consumption fell by 40% between 1989
and 1993, and in 2000 it was still 22% below the 1989 level (Togores
and García, 2003).
13
 In the State agricultural markets, the State supplies 60% of the
products, the private sector 34%, and the cooperatives 6% (García
Molina, 2004). This author does not provide information on the
breakdown of the total supply between the two markets (free and
state).
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it was still 20% below the 1989 level, although there
were notable differences between the various careers:
enrolment in agricultural sciences went down by 57%,
in natural sciences and mathematics by 38%, in
technical courses by 32%, and in medicine by 26%,
whereas in humanities and social sciences it increased
by 565%, and in education, by 343% (table 6). In the
light of the severe shortage of resources, the enormous
investment in some humanities careers or in education
(although the number of students per teacher is the
lowest in the region), contrasting with the deficit in
careers that are crucial for development, not only
represents inefficient resource allocation but will also
create a serious problem in the future. Even so,
Dhaynaut and Máttar (2004, pp. 306 and 307) maintain
that “the levels of enrolment in technical and higher
education are determined as a function of the
requirements of economic development” and that
“priority is given to technical and scientific
specialities”.
One of the reasons for the fall in university
enrolment is the reversal of the wages pyramid. Before
the crisis, doctors, engineers, university professors and
other professionals were at the peak of the pyramid,
but they have now been replaced in that position by
owners of small restaurants (although the number of
these has recently been reduced), owners of means of
transport, tourism employees, small private peasants,
etc. It is not reasonable to study for four to six years
in the university, only to receive a very low salary on
graduation, and this explains why many professionals
have left their State posts to engage in better-paid
activities. Thanks to the salary increases in education,
in 2002 the basic monthly salary of a teacher was
between 280 and 330 pesos, possibly amounting to as
much as 425 pesos with additional payments, but these
salaries “are still not sufficient to be able to face the
high cost of living today” (Pérez Izquierdo, 2004a, p.
111). The last-named amount is equal to 16 dollars per
month at the exchange rate used in the money changing
offices, which is not enough to buy food in the foreign-
currency stores for the three weeks not covered by
rationing (Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López, 2005).
An effort has recently been made to universalize
higher education. In 2002-2003, the enrolment in
humanities and social sciences was 530% higher than
in 2000-2001. In 2003-2004, the authorities reported
an impressive increase in enrolment in higher education
as a whole, although the figures varied from source to
source: 128,377 (Castro, 2003); 146,913 (Rodríguez,
2003), and 300,000 according to the Minister of Higher
Education,14 who said that the 17 universities had been
“multiplied” with the creation of 732 university centres
in the municipalities, while the number of professors
had gone up by 83%. Half the new students are
distance education students in socio-cultural studies,
social work, teaching, and People’s Universities for
retired persons. A number of important questions
TABLE 6
Cuba: University enrolment, by areas of study, in
1989/1990, 1995/1999 and 2002/2003
Area of study 1989/90 1995/99 2002/03a Variation between
lowest level 2002/03 and
1989/90 (%)
Humanities and social sciences 5 095 5 366 33 898 565
Education 15 529 35 068 6 782 343
Economics 18 789 4 893 20 307 8
Agriculture 11 606 4 680 5 039 –57
Natural sciences and mathematics 6 399 4 019 3 934 –38
Technical courses 29 819 13 020 20 134 –32
Medicine 37 305 23 457 27 702 –26
Totalb 242 366 102 598 192 864  –20
Source: Comité Estatal de Estadísticas (1991); ONE (1998, 2001 and 2003).
a In 2002, enrolment in the humanities and social sciences, as well as in economics, was increased by between 10% and 14% from the 1996/
1997 period to the 2001/2002 period, without any explanation, resulting in increases in total university enrolment.
b Excluding physical education and art.
14
 Interview with Minister Vecino Alegret in Granma, Havana, 16
December 2003.
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spring to mind in this connection, however: whether
there is not a risk that the students involved in this
massive expansion of higher education may not study
hard; how it is possible to increase the number of
higher educational institutions by a factor of over 43
and expand the number of professors and the level of
enrolment by 83% and 56%, respectively, all in a single
year; what type of training the 44,000 professors
recently hired have had; what is the quality of the new
study courses, and where the 300,000 potential
graduates will find work.
According to Pérez Izquierdo, some Cuban studies
consider that the programme for the universalization
of higher education “will cause social tensions, because
the dynamics of the demand by the economy for
university graduates are only limited, and there could
even be an increase in the tendencies to emigrate
abroad”. He also acknowledges that in spite of the
advances made, there are still problems, especially with
regard to “education as a strategic sector for promoting
economic development”. The new programmes
“represent a challenge for the Cuban model, since their
massive implementation calls for efficient utilization
and a substantial rise in the (…) levels of training, and
the large-scale results cannot yet be appraised” (ECLAC,
2004; Pérez Izquierdo, 2004a, pp. 96 and 116).
6. Health
Beyond any doubt, on the eve of the crisis the national
health system of Cuba had reached the highest levels
in Latin America, but Cuban medicine was marked by
its excessively high costs, its very intensive use of
capital, and its dependence on the socialist bloc (ECLAC,
2000a, pp. 274 and 275). The loss of the capacity to
import medicines, spare parts, medical equipment and
supplies from the Soviet Union, together with the acute
shortage of foreign exchange and the deterioration in
nutritional conditions, adversely affected the
functioning of the health system, although care
continued to be universally available and free of
charge, which is a notable achievement. It is debatable
whether the level of health expenditure was maintained
during the crisis or not. On the basis of 1981 prices
and the consumer price index, it has been calculated
that real per capita expenditure on health shrank from
66.90 pesos in 1989 to 16.40 pesos in 1993,
subsequently recovering to 53.00 pesos in 1999,
although this was still 21% below the 1989 level (Sixto,
2003). Pérez Izquierdo, however, estimates that real per
capita health expenditure continued to rise during the
crisis and, at 1997 prices, increased by 40 pesos
between 1997 and 2002 (Pérez Izquierdo, 2004b, pp.
172 and 173). In any case, per capita health expenditure
in Cuba in 2002 (229 dollars, based on purchasing
power parity) came fourteenth in the region: only six
countries —the least developed— had a lower level of
expenditure (UNDP, 2004).15
During the crisis, almost all the health indicators
seriously deteriorated, and although they have
improved in the recovery stage, several of them have
still not recovered their previous levels. The infant
mortality rate in Cuba continued to decline during the
crisis, and in 2002 it was 6.5 per thousand live births
(the lowest in the hemisphere after Canada, and similar
to that of the United States), but the indices of mortality
among mothers giving birth and among the population
over 65 showed the opposite trend (table 7). In 2001
Cuba changed the maternal mortality series, because
previously the “total” figure included direct mortality,
indirect mortality, and that attributable to “other
causes”, but the new series eliminates “other causes”,
which results in a significantly lower rate, and it only
goes back to 1996, which prevents comparison with the
1989 level. In 2000, the rate was 55.7 per 100,000 live
births in the old series, but only 40.4 in the new one,
since this excluded 15.3 for “other causes”. The new
series shows an increase from 38.6 in 1997 to 41.7 in
2002, and the 2002 rate in the new series, which
excludes “other causes”, is higher than the “total” of
29.2 in 1989, which included these causes. On the basis
of the new series, and omitting the figures for 1997-
1998, Pérez Izquierdo claims that the “total” maternal
mortality rate went down from 43.8 in 1999 to 41.7 in
2002 (Pérez Izquierdo, 2004b, p. 179). Mortality
among the population aged 65 or more increased from
48.4 per thousand in 1989 to 55.7 in 1993, later going
down to 49.7 in 2001, but this latter figure is still
somewhat higher than the pre-crisis level.
With regard to morbidity, the 1989-2002 trend
displays considerable differences between diseases.
The eradication or reduction of the incidence of
diphtheria, poliomyelitis, measles, tetanus and pertussis
continued, but the incidence of other illnesses increased
considerably during the worst stage of the crisis,
although it subsequently went down; in 2002 the
15
 In terms of total health expenditure as a percentage of GDP, Cuba
came sixth in the region in 2002, virtually drawing with two other
countries. The total Cuban health expenditure of 7.2% of GDP is
broken down into 6.2% public and 1% private, however, which is
debatable because private medicine is prohibited. If only public
expenditure is taken, then Cuba would come tenth in the region
(according to data from UNDP, 2004).
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TABLE 7
Cuba: Infant and maternal mortality rates, and mortality among
the population aged 65 or more, 1989-2002
Year Infant mortality Maternal mortality Mortality among polulatin aged
(per thousand live births) (per thousand live births) 65 or more (per thousand
Old seriesa New seriesb persons in this age group)
1989 11.1 29.2 48.4
1993 9.4 49.3 55.7
1994 9.9 65.2 54.5
1995 9.4 57.1 52.5
1996 7.9 44.9 36.4 54.9
1997 7.2 50.4 38.6 52.3
1998 7.1 47.7 39.1 50.2
1999 6.5 52.4 43.8 52.2
2000 7.2 55.7 40.4 49.7
2001 6.2 33.9 49.7
2002 6.5 41.7
Source: Comité Estatal de Estadísticas (1991); ONE (1998, 2001 and 2003); (MINSAP, 1995 to 2003).
a Total maternal mortality, including direct and indirect mortality and that due to other causes.
b Excluding mortality from other causes, which averaged 10.6 per 100,000 in 1998-2000.
incidence of acute diarrhoea, chicken pox, syphilis and
blenorrhea was below the 1989 level, while in the case
of acute respiratory diseases, viral hepatitis and
tuberculosis it was higher, as may be seen from table 8.
In spite of these trends in the official statistics, Pérez
Izquierdo (2004b, pp. 155 and 156) asserts that “the
indicators … of morbidity were not substantially
affected in the most acute years of the crisis”.
As from the 1990s, the Ministry of Public Health
substantially modified its objectives “by giving priority
to the promotion of health and the prevention of
diseases”, which “has had important results in the
reduction … of transmissible diseases”; it also
“continues with its efforts to develop domestically
produced vaccines that will make the country self-
sufficient in this respect in the future” (Pérez Izquierdo,
2004b, pp. 155-156 and 167). Part B of table 8,
however, shows that the prevention of transmissible
diseases through immunization has significantly
declined. In 2002, the immunized population was
between 25% and 90% below the 1989 level in the case
of the five basic vaccines, and it was also below that
level in the worst period of the crisis. BCG vaccination
went down by 56%, although the incidence of
tuberculosis in 2002 was 60% higher than the 1989
level.16 Cuba occupies the eighth place in the region
in terms of mortality due to transmissible diseases
(PAHO, 2004).
In the 1990s, the almost total interruption of the
provision of medical supplies, replacement equipment
and chemicals from the socialist bloc, together with the
drop in electricity generation, affected the pumps and
drinking water supply and sanitation systems, reduced
the hours they were in service, and considerably
reduced the treatment of drinking water and its
potability, giving rise to an increase in some infectious
diseases. Atienza claims that by 2002 the 1990 levels
had been surpassed through the construction of dams,
water supply lines, water treatment plants and pumping
stations, but the statistics she gives are from 1999-2002
and not from 1989, thus making it impossible to
confirm the alleged advances over the long term. In
actual fact, in 1999-2002 there was no increase in the
number of water treatment plants, and there continued
to be only one fluoridation station (Atienza, 2004b,
table 45). Furthermore, the official figure for the
volume of waste water evacuated through the sewer
system was 672 hm3 in 1998 (ONE, 2001) but only
569 hm3 in 2002: a reduction of 15% over the period.
The quality of drinking water supply has deteriorated
for several reasons: the average duration of drinking
water supply is 12 hours per day, which obliges part
16
 The variations from year to year may be due to appreciable
changes in the number of births per year and the ages at which the
vaccines are administered, however. This is a point which calls for
further research.
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of the population to store water in tanks and other
recipients, thus reducing the benefits of water treatment
(the population of Havana have to boil their drinking
water in order to avoid giardia and other parasites); the
water distribution system is insufficient, and part of it
and of the pumping equipment is in bad condition, and
water supply is unstable because of interruptions in the
electricity supply (Atienza, 2004b, p. 281).
Although efforts have been made to maximize the
available resources, there are various indicators which
point to inefficiency. The number of real medical care
beds went down from 5 to 4.5 per thousand inhabitants
between 1989 and 2001, but their index of occupation
dropped from 73.9% to 69.8%, to 56% in children’s
hospitals, and to 48% in maternity hospitals.17
Moreover, the average stay in hospital increased from
9.9 days in 1989 to 10.4 in 1993, although it
subsequently went down to 9.4 in 2001 (ONE, 1998 and
2003; MINSAP, 1995 to 2003). If the average stay had
been reduced to seven days in 2001 (still high by
international standards), the index of occupation would
have gone down to 56.2%. The system of family
doctors has considerably aided in decentralizing
medical attention and making it more personalized, but
it is costly to operate (it represents half of total health
expenditure) and its effectiveness has been reduced
because of the lack of the most essential medicines. As
infant mortality has gone down, the efforts to continue
reducing it have become more difficult and costly,
among other reasons, because of the cost of techniques
for detecting congenital fetal problems and providing
special nutrition for mothers. This is a positive
development, but it requires heavy outlays of very
scarce resources on a problem which has already been
substantially solved, whereas there are much more
serious and urgent needs, such as improving the
drinking water supply infrastructure, nutrition, the low
pensions paid, and housing problems. The scholarships
offered to foreigners to study medicine and other
disciplines, as well as the dispatch of thousands of
medical professionals (including family doctors) to
other countries as part of the external aid programme,
are praiseworthy initiatives, but they represent a heavy
fiscal burden. The existence of a separate (and
superior) health system for the armed forces, internal
security staff and the top political leadership is not only
costly but also represents an irritating inequality for a
population which has to put up with harsh restrictions
(Mesa-Lago, 2003b).
TABLE 8
Cuba: Morbidity rates for selected transmissible diseases and immunized
population, by type of vaccine, before the crisis, at its height, and in 2002
A. Morbidity (raes per 100 000 inhabitants)
Disease  1989 1992-1996 2002 Variation (%)a
Acute respiratory diseases 36 804 45 021 40 034 9
Acute diarrhoea 8 842 10 380 7 892 –10
Chicken pox 365 1 138 149 –59
Blenorrhea 381 412 114 –70
Hepatitis 106 295 125 18
Syphilis 82 143 41 –50
Tuberculosis 5 14 8 60
B. Immunized population (thousands of persons)
Vaccine 1989 1993-1994 2002 Variation (%)a
Poliomyelitis 840 616 589 –30
Tuberculosis (BCG) 320 149 140 –56
Double 157 164 118 –25
Triple (DPT)b 354 310 129 –64
Typhoid 597 553 60 –90
Source: Comité Estatal de Estadísticas (1991); ONE (1998 and 2003).
a 2002 compared with 1989.
b Diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus.
17
 This is due to the decline in the birthrate and the ageing of the
population, but the hospitals which are no longer needed should be
closed down in order to save resources, or should be converted into
old people’s homes.
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7. Social security and assistance
The government unified 54 different social security
pension programmes and markedly extended the
coverage of the economically active population,
although it has never published statistics on this latter
action. The system covers all employed persons on a
compulsory basis, but self-employed workers, unpaid
family members and most private peasants can join the
system voluntarily by paying contributions which are
not paid by the vast majority of employees and are a
serious obstacle to the incorporation of the groups in
question. The regular retirement ages are among the
lowest in Latin America: 60 for men and 55 for
women, subject to 25 years’ service; since the average
life expectancy at retirement age in Cuba is the highest
in the region (20 years for men and 26 for women),
this enormously increases the cost of the system. The
situation is made still worse by the fact that Cuba has
the oldest population in the region after Uruguay and,
according to CELADE-ECLAC Population Division, it will
occupy the first place in this respect before 2025. The
situation will become more acute from 2010 on, when
more persons will retire than those entering the EAP,
and it will get still worse in 2020-2030, when the
baby boomers of the 1960s reach retirement age
(ECLAC, 2000a).
Table 9 summarizes the financial aspects of the
system, comparing 1989 and 2003. Over this period,
social security pension expenditure increased from
5.3% to 6.5% of GDP and is financed by a payroll levy,
increased from 10% to 12%, which is paid entirely by
employers and goes directly into the State budget. A
contribution payable by the workers was introduced in
the 1994 tax law but was suspended until 1997, when
a contribution of 5% of the salary began to be collected
from workers employed in enterprises under the
improvement plan (plan de perfeccionamiento
empresarial), who represented only 2% of the total
number of employed persons in 2002. Self-employed
workers, artists and other voluntary contributors pay
12% of their declared income. The percentage levied
on wages is not enough to finance the system, and
results in a growing deficit which is covered by the
State. The fiscal subsidy increased from 1.3% to 2.3%
of GDP between 1986 and 2003 and will keep on
growing with the ageing process. The ratio of active
workers per pensioner went down from 3.6 in 1989 to
2.8 in 2002, and it is projected to fall to 1.5 by 2025.
In 2003, a contribution of 17.9% of the payroll was
required in order to balance the system, but this
percentage would have to increase over the long term
to 39% or even as much as 86%, according to different
scenarios (Mesa-Lago, 2003b). Ramos notes cautiously
TABLE 9
Cuba: Financing, deficit, cost and level of social
security pensions, 1989 and 2003
Indicators 1989 2003 Variation
2003/1989
(%)
Income (millions of pesos) 664a 1 405 111
Expenditure (millions of pesos) 897a 2 101 134
Deficit (millions of pesos) 233a 696 198
Deficit financed by the State (% of GDP) 1.3a 2.3 77
Total cost of pensions (% of GDP) 5.3 6.6 24
Present contribution (% of payroll) 10.0 12.0 20
Contribution needed in order to eliminate deficit (% of payroll)b 13.5a 17.9 32
Number of active workers per pensioner 3.6 2.8c –22
Nominal average monthly pension (pesos) 56 108c 93
Real monthly pension (pesos per month) 56 33d –41
Average monthly pension (dollars)e 8.00 4.15c –48
Source: 1986-1989: Mesa-Lago (2003b); 2003: ONE (2003) and ECLAC (2004), Álvarez and Máttar (2004).
a 1986.
b In order to balance the pension system actuarially in the long term, a contribution of between 39% and 86% would be required, depending
on the different scenarios.
c 2002.
d 1998.
e At the black market exchange rate in 1986 and at the rate given by Cajas de Cambio S.A. (CADECA) in 2002.
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that “in spite of the fiscal implications it may have, the
government’s policy has been characterized by the
assignment of higher priority to social objectives over
economic ones, [but the sustained rise in costs] will
demand fresh financial resources, so that the economic
sustainability of the system could be affected” (Ramos,
2004, pp. 231 and 238). ECLAC had been more
outspoken when it warned that the fiscal subsidies for
social security “displace resources from investment
[which has decreased] and the lower capital formation
limits the prospects in terms of growth, employment
and wages” (ECLAC, 2000a, pp. 270 and 271).
In spite of the enormous expenditure they have
entailed, social security pensions have always been
meagre, but before the crisis they were supplemented
with the subsidized prices of consumer goods,
transport, electricity and water, free or very low-rent
housing, and free health attention of acceptable quality.
Real average pensions declined by 41% between 1989
and 1998 (at 1981 prices), however, and the
supplementary social protection network deteriorated.
Ramos (2004, p. 228) says that the real average pension
increased between 1992 and 2001 and went down in
2002, but he does not give any figures. Although it is
not possible to compare real pensions in pesos in 1989
and 2002, in the latter year the average monthly
pension was 108 pesos, equivalent to 4.15 dollars and
48% lower than the 1989 level (table 9).
Between 1997 and 2000, the number of cases of
social assistance decreased by 1.2%, but in 2002 it rose
by 42%. In that year there were 192,511 persons
receiving social assistance: a figure equivalent to only
1.7% of the total population of 11.2 million
(calculations based on Ramos, 2004, pp. 225-226 and
231-232). The population at risk and the poverty
incidence referred to earlier amount to at least 20% of
the total population, so that most poor people do not
receive social assistance. Social assistance expenditure
remained unchanged at 0.5-0.6% of GDP in 1989-2000,
but rose to 1.2% in 2002 (Mesa-Lago, 2003b; ONE,
2003). Real social assistance expenditure per
beneficiary went down by 60% between 1997 and
2002, however (calculation based on Anexo
Estadístico, II-47 and II-49). The average social
assistance pension in 2002 was 64 pesos per month
(2.42 dollars).
Social assistance has a progressive impact on
distribution, whereas social security pensions have a
neutral effect, but there are two special systems
separate from the general system —for the Armed
Forces and the Ministry of the Interior— which have
different access conditions and levels of benefits
(Ferriol, 2004a, p. 84; Ramos, 2004, p. 222). The cost
of these two systems is enormous and their impact is
probably regressive. A male member of the armed
forces who joins at the age of 17 and accumulates 25
years of service can retire at 43 (17 years earlier than
in the general system) and receives a pension
equivalent to 100% of his salary in his last year of
service (compared with 50% of the average wages in
the last five years in the general system) for an average
of 37 years (17 years more than in the general system).
In 1995 the cost of the armed forces pension system,
financed entirely from the State budget, was equal to
the deficit on the entire general system, and in order
to balance it a contribution of 118% of the member’s
salary would be needed (Donate, 1995).
8. Housing
A serious obstacle that prevents an accurate count of
the number of dwellings built is the lack of a
homogeneous statistical series for the period since the
revolution. In 1959-1963, no annual figures were
published; in 1964-1980 an annual series on housing
construction by the civil sector of the State began; in
1981-1987 dwellings built by cooperatives, the armed
forces, and the population at large were added (making
a distinction between dwellings that had been inspected
and certified as suitable for occupation and those that
had not); and from 1988 on uncertified dwellings and
those of the armed forces were excluded from the
series. In 1981-1987, because of the relaxation of the
restrictions on housing construction and the greater
availability of building materials, the largest number
of dwellings since the revolution were constructed and
the percentage built by the civil population averaged
60%. The 1988 Housing Act, however, imposed stricter
conditions on the construction and exchange of
dwellings, did away with the sale of building materials
to the population at large, strengthened the role of the
State and laid down penalties for non-compliance. The
crisis caused a sharp fall in the production of building
materials between 1990 and 2001, with reductions of
59% in the production of cement, 64% in that of
blocks, 71% in sand and stones, and 73% in bricks
(Atienza, 2004a, p. 248). These two factors reduced the
percentage of dwellings built by the population at large
to an average of only 34% of the total in 1990-2002,
while housing construction under the three five-year
plans between 1981 and 1990 fell short of the target
figures by 45% (Mesa-Lago, 2000).
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TABLE 10
Cuba: Housing construction, 1981-2003
1981-89 1990-94 1995-03 2003
Annual average number of dwellings builta 61 198 28 638 41 604 25 000
Dwellings built per 1,000 inhabitants 6.1 2.8 4.5 2.2
Housing deficit (thousands of units) 800 1 000
Source: 1981-1989 and 1990-1994: Mesa-Lago (2000); 1995-2003: ONE (1998 to 2003); 2003: ECLAC (2004). The 2003 deficit is an estimate
by Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López (2005).
a Calculation based on the total number of dwellings built in 1981-1989, including those which did not have an inspection certificate, which
were not reported in the 1988-2003 period.
The average number of dwellings built per year
shrank from 61,198 units in 1981-1989 to 26,638 in
1990-1994 (albeit with the above-mentioned
problems), subsequently recovering to 41,604 in 1995-
2003, but even so it was still 30% below the pre-crisis
level, and moreover the number of dwellings built in
2003 fell to 25,000, which was below the average for
the worst stage of the crisis. Over the periods and years
in question, the number of dwellings built per 1,000
inhabitants decreased from 6.1 to 2.8, recovered to 4.5,
but then fell to 2.2 (table 10). García Molina claims
that as from 1994 “the number of dwellings built
recovered significantly”, whereas Atienza, more
cautiously, says that the new policy giving priority to
the maintenance, repair and rehabilitation of housing
“prevented the collapse of the sector in the early 1990s
and made it possible to continue the process” (García
Molina, 2004, p. 13; Atienza, 2004a, p. 249).
According to Atienza, the housing stock grew
from 1.90 to 3.13 million units between 1990 and 2002,
with a reduction in the number of inhabitants per
dwelling from 4.51 to 3.13, but this was not only due
to the construction of new dwellings: it was also the
result of the division of existing dwellings and their
construction on the roofs of existing housing.
Moreover, the 1991 census (the results of the 2002
census had not yet been published by the end of 2004)
“showed that the housing stock was largely ageing”
and that “the failure to do enough to maintain and
rehabilitate the stock had caused its progressive
deterioration, [so that] some 40% of dwellings were
now in mediocre or bad condition” (a proportion that
rose to over 50% in the eastern provinces).18 In 2000-
2001, three hurricanes destroyed 35,724 dwellings and
damaged a further 272,105, so that resources had to be
concentrated on the reconstruction of those dwellings
and there was a reduction in the maintenance and
rehabilitation effort (Atienza, 2004a, pp. 258-260).
Lastly, the Economic Development Strategy for 1980-
2000 considered that it would be necessary to build an
average of 60,000 dwellings per year in that period
solely in order to replace those which had been
destroyed (García Díaz, Deputy Minister of the Central
Planning Board, who was responsible for the housing
plan at that time); but as the annual average actually
built was only 48,000 dwellings in that period, the
deficit must have substantially increased.
Atienza asserts that the “real” housing deficit,
taking into account the losses through deterioration or
destruction, amounts to 530,000 units, but she does not
give any figures or calculations in support of this
statement19 (Atienza, 2004a, p. 258). Assuming an
average of three persons per dwelling, this deficit
would affect 1.6 million persons or 14% of the total
population. Based on a conservative estimate of the
number of units destroyed, the deficit in 1985 was
880,000 dwellings, and as the rate of housing
construction slackened in the 1990s, the deficit must
have exceeded a million units in 2003 (Mesa-Lago and
Pérez-López, 2005). With regard to this topic, a Cuban
economist says: “Housing [is] the most serious social
problem affecting the country … the accumulated
needs are substantially greater [than the new dwellings
built], among other reasons because of the serious
deterioration in the existing dwellings” (Triana, 2000,
p. 10). In the survey carried out in the capital in 2002,
18
 In Havana, 43% of the dwellings were in mediocre or bad
condition in 1999, and this proportion rose to 75% in the old part
of the city, while in the city as a whole, structural problems were
reported in 59% of the dwellings (Pérez Villanueva, 2001).
19
 Among the challenges identified by Atienza is the need for “more
specific studies which will make it possible to gain a more precise
idea of the magnitude of the housing deficit” (Atienza, 2004a,
p. 263).
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16% of those interviewed said that deterioration of their
dwellings was the most serious problem affecting them,
after insufficient income and food supplies; 22%
described themselves as poor in terms of housing, and
19% said they were “almost poor” (Ferriol, 2003;
Atienza, 2004a, p. 262).
20
 I have shown that although exogenous factors aggravated the
situation, the slowdown was due mainly to an internal factor: the
interruption of the economic reforms (a point which has also been
made by various Cuban economists) (Mesa-Lago, 2003a).
IV
Is Cuba an integral development
example for the region?
The introduction by Dhaynaut and Máttar to the book
Política social y reformas estructurales: Cuba a
principios del siglo XXI (Álvarez and Máttar, 2004)
reaffirms a very true axiom of eclac: economic growth
alone is not enough; it does not automatically give rise
to greater equity, but nor is it possible to achieve social
well-being without sustained growth of production, so
that both these objectives must be linked together in
“integral development”. Said introduction also refers
to the unsatisfactory economic and social results
achieved by Latin America in the last decade, which
make it necessary “to seek new political, social and
economic balances which favour better social
protection in a context of equity and development”
(Dhaynaut and Máttar, 2004, pp. 11-13). For her part,
Ferriol says that Cuba is “an interesting case” of
“growth with justice, because of its simultaneous
attention to both economic and social problems”
through an integral development model which, over the
last four decades, has advanced in terms of social
welfare and equity in spite of the collapse of the
socialist bloc, the subsequent crisis, and the external
restrictions (Ferriol, 2004a, pp. 58-59). In the last
chapter of the book referred to above, Dhaynaut and
Máttar ratify that “The contributions … made by the
case of Cuba are very valuable for furthering
international reflection on the possibilities of achieving
production development with equity (Dhaynaut and
Máttar, 2004, p. 306).
García Molina considers that Cuba simultaneously
achieved economic growth and social equity in 1959-
1989 but, because of the crisis, its GDP fell by 33%
between 1989 and 1993, although it increased by an
average of 3.4% per year in 1998-2002; he argues
that although the growth rate went down in the last
three years, this was due to exogenous factors (the
drop in world sugar and nickel prices and in
international tourism, and the damage done by three
hurricanes);20 he adds that in 2003 Cuba’s growth rate
speeded up, showing the dynamism of its economy,
and he concludes by saying that that rate was higher
than the average of 1.3% registered for Latin America
as a whole, thus contrasting favourably with a regional
setting of “flattening out” and a “lost six years” (García
Molina, 2004, pp. 44-48). It should be noted that his
analysis does not give integrated figures for the 1989-
2003 period.
Abundant evidence has been provided in the
present article that contradicts the claim that Cuba has
simultaneously achieved economic growth and social
development in the 1990-2003 period, as well as the
presentation of the Cuban model as an example for the
region of balance between economic and social goals
and integral development. The main conclusions on the
economic and social evolution of Cuba are given
below, ending with an analysis of the supposed balance
between these two elements of Cuban policy.
1. Summary of economic trends
The following conclusions refute the claim that Cuba
is an economic development model for the region:
i) The annual variation in the Cuban GDP averaged
–1.4% over the 1991-2000 period: the lowest rate
in Latin America and the Caribbean. Although the
change in the base year at constant prices and the
incomplete GDP series impede a proper calculation
in this respect, I estimate that in 1991-2003 the
average growth rate was 0.5%, but it is not
possible to make comparisons with the rest of the
region; in 2003 the 1989 level of per capita GDP
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had probably still not been recovered, so that
Cuba had lost 14 years rather than the “lost six
years” of the region as a whole.
ii) Although there are different series on gross
investment, all indicate that there was a serious
drop in 1989-2003 and a severe decapitalization
process that will affect growth; the Cuban
investment coefficient is low by regional
standards.
iii) In spite of the recovery, in 2003 the main
agricultural and manufacturing products were still
between 20% and 89% below the 1989 level,
although important exceptions in this respect are
oil and nickel production, in spite of the reduction
in the latter in 2002 and 2003.
iv) The value of exports in 2003 continued to be 70%
below the 1989 level, while imports were 43%
lower; exports continue to be concentrated in
traditional products, while imports reflect a
decline in food self-sufficiency, import
substitution and industrialization. The terms of
trade deteriorated by 56% between 1989 and 2003
and the trade deficit on goods in the latter year
was US$ 3 billion and has been growing since
1995. The external debt increased by 77%
between 1989 and 2003, while disbursed foreign
direct investment averaged only US$ 200 million
throughout the 1991-2002 period and has gone
down since.
v) Tourism and remittances are the main sources of
foreign exchange, but they are not able to offset
the severe reductions in other sources.
2. Summary of social trends
It has also been shown in this article that virtually all
the social indicators deteriorated during the worst stage
of the crisis, and although some of them had recovered
their 1989 levels in 2003 others were still below them,
while still others had suffered a continual decline.
i) Although there are no official statistics of
poverty incidence, Cuban estimates of the urban
population at risk show a rise from 6% to 20% between
1988 and 2002; the poverty severity index for the total
population was 0.39-0.42 in 1995 and the incidence of
poverty was 61%-67% in the same year, while 31%
of the population of the capital considered themselves
to be poor in 2002.
ii) Nor are there any official statistics on income
distribution, but Cuban and foreign estimates indicate
that this distribution has become more unequal, with
the Gini coefficient increasing from 0.22 in 1986 to
0.407 in 1999, and the ratio of the richest to the poorest
income quintile rising from 3.8 to 13.5 between 1989
and 1999; inequality is increased by the segmented
markets and the fact that part of the population receive
remittances from abroad.
iii) The official open unemployment rate went
down from 8% in 1989 to 2.3% in 2003, but these
figures are dubious: the employment figures appear to
include persons who are not really employed, as they
are studying or receiving unemployment benefit, and
they also conceal considerable underemployment: my
rough estimates suggest an unemployment rate of 21%
in 2000, compared with the official figure of 5.4%. The
expansion of employment has mainly been in the
services sector, but this is also the sector showing the
biggest decrease in productivity (a decline of 3.7 points
between 1991 and 2002), which is another indicator of
under-utilization.
iv) Before the crisis, rationing satisfied the basic
food needs of the population, but it now covers only
about one week of consumption and for the rest of the
month the population has to buy food in the free
markets and the foreign currency stores at prices
between 4 and 49 times higher than those of rationed
goods; there are contradictory figures as to whether the
nutritional levels of 1989 had been recovered in 2003
or not.
v) The enrolment rate in elementary education
was maintained during the crisis, but the rate for
secondary education fell, although it has now virtually
recovered its 1989 level. University enrolment in 2003
was still 20% below the 1989 level, however; it went
down by between 32% and 57% in careers that are vital
for development (agronomy, natural sciences and
mathematics, technical studies) but soared up by 343%
in education (although the number of students per
teacher was already the lowest in the region) and by
565% in the humanities and social sciences. The
attempt to universalize higher education in 2002-2003
raises serious doubts about its efficiency and results.
vi) In 1989 the levels of health in Cuba were the
highest in the region, but the crisis adversely affected
all of them except infant mortality, which continued
to decline and by 2003 was the second lowest in the
entire continent. The maternal mortality rate rose from
29 to 42 per 100,000 live births in 1989-2002, and the
mortality among the population aged 65 or more rose
up to 1996 but subsequently started to go down again,
although in 2001 it had still not recovered its 1989
level. Morbidity indicators show an uneven evolution;
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immunization against transmissible diseases has gone
down, there has been a deterioration in the quality of
health and drinking water supply, and there are some
signs of inefficiency, such as a reduction in the hospital
bed occupation, while the average period spent in
hospital continues to be high.
vii) The Cuban population is the second oldest in
the region, but retirement ages are among the lowest,
while Cuba comes second in life expectancy: this
means a longer period of retirement, at a cost to the
country equivalent to 6.5% of GDP in 2003 that
continues to rise; the 12% pension contribution is paid
by the enterprises (only 2% of employed workers pay
contributions) and is insufficient to cover expenditure:
the deficit is financed by the State and rose from 1.3%
to 2.3% of GDP between 1986 and 2003. In order to
balance the pension system in the long term, it would
be necessary to increase the current contribution to
between 39% and 86% of the payroll. The real pension
paid decreased by half over the period studied and
social assistance only covers 1.7% of the population,
although at least 20% are considered to be poor or at
risk. The pension scheme for the armed forces and
Ministry of the Interior, however, has much more
advantageous conditions and benefits than the general
system, to such an extent that balancing it would
require a contribution of 118% of the payroll.
viii) Housing is the most serious social problem
in Cuba; although there is no systematic statistical
series in this respect, housing construction per
thousand inhabitants averaged 6.1 in 1981-1989, fell
to 2.8 in the worst stage of the crisis, but subsequently
recovered to 4.5 in 1995-2002 (although falling back
to 2.2 in the last year), which is still far below the
average for the 1980s. There are contradictory figures
on the housing deficit, but it probably exceeded one
million units in 2003.
3. The imbalance between social and economic
objectives
This article has also shown the often excessive priority
given in Cuba to social over economic goals, and the
adverse results this policy has had, a problem referred
to in Álvarez and Máttar (2004), although from
divergent points of view. Ferriol (2004a, pp. 59 and
88) says that one of “the central objectives [of Cuban
policy] has been the improvement of social welfare and
equity, sometimes even at the expense of postponing
economic goals, [but] in order to reduce the problems
of poverty, inequality and vulnerability it is necessary
to achieve advances in economic conditions, because
growth is also a necessary condition for social
development”. García Molina (2004, p. 19) states that
at the dawn of the twenty-first century, “Cuba
confronts the challenge of achieving the economic
sustainability of the social results obtained in the last
few decades” and suggests, without going into detail,
that “this situation has given rise to insufficient growth
of the product”. Dhaynaut and Máttar, in contrast,
argue that although “there has not always been a
balance between social and economic goals” there has
nevertheless been “a strong capacity to adapt policies
to limit their adverse effects” and conclude that the
Cuban strategy “is based on constant appraisal … in
order to achieve results simultaneously in the fields of
… equity, development and welfare” (Dhaynaut and
Máttar, 2004, pp. 305-307).
In a previous study, I showed that the excessive
emphasis of Cuban policy on social objectives to the
detriment of economic considerations —especially in
the 1966-1970 and 1986-1990 periods— led to
imbalances and adverse effects (Mesa-Lago, 2000).
The present article comes to the same conclusions for
the 1991-2003 period, due to:
i) the priority given to the creation of jobs, at the
expense of a drop in labour productivity;
ii) the plan for the universalization of higher
education, with emphasis on the humanities, social
sciences and education (although Cuba has long
had the lowest number of students per teacher in
the region), while the careers which are of
fundamental importance for development have
suffered considerable drops in enrolment; and
without taking into account the need to give
productive employment to the resulting graduates;
iii) the costly effort to reduce infant mortality still
further —even though Cuba already attained the
lowest rate in the region and the second lowest
in the continent years ago— while serious
shortcomings persist in terms of nutrition,
housing, drinking water supply and sanitation
infrastructure, etc.;
iv) the resistance to the closure of hospitals which are
no longer needed (especially in the areas of
gynecology and pediatrics) or their conversion
into old people’s homes, in spite of the fall in the
index of occupation of hospital beds;
v) the maintenance of retirement ages of 55 for
women and 60 for men (the lowest in the region,
after Haiti), at the cost of enormous and growing
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outlays on social security pensions and the
reduction of the resources available for investment
and growth; and
vi) the persistence of price subsidies and the
provision of social services totally free of charge,
regardless of income, which results in subsidies
for high-income groups, rather than the
establishment of a universal social assistance
system focused on the poor population.21
This is my appraisal of the current situation in
Cuba. The economic and social policies needed to




 Ferriol (2004b, p. 148) rightly notes that price subsidies through
rationing are given to all members of the population, regardless of
their income, which implies inefficient social policy that increases
income inequality.
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